On March 20, 2003, the United States and a handful of steadfast allies (including our always loyal friends the Brits) went to war in Iraq and deposed one of the most vile dictators on the planet. Within a few short months, however, the glow of the unquestionably brilliant and successful conventional military campaign had faded as US and allied troops faced a brewing insurgency by Sunni militants and Islamic terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida. Shortly thereafter, the radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr launched a separate uprising with his army of Shia thugs and terrorists. But now, after five and a half years, we can authoritatively say that the we have won the war in Iraq. So, today we—a consortium of more than 170 blogs—commemorate this hard-won victory as a tribute to our soldiers and to mark this victory in the historical record to prevent future revisionism by politicized historians.


Declaring Victory

Some critics may claim that the date chosen for Victory in Iraq Day (or V-I Day for short, akin to V-E day in the spring of 1945 during World War II) is arbitrary. Why today? Why not last week? To some degree they are right. In fact, the United States could have claimed victory this summer or earlier this fall by all reasonable measures. Yet, that doesn't change the fundamental thesis that is born out by facts on the ground, the war in Iraq is over. And it is readily apparent to all fair-minded people today. While there will be lingering low-level violence for the next few years as pockets of regime dead enders and remnants of al-Qa'ida in Iraq choose to fight on, the "war" part of the Iraq War is over. We won.

The Iraq War, after the fall of Saddam's regime, has actually been a five-headed challenge, involving three wars (a war against Sunni insurgents, a war against Shia militants and their Iranian sponsors, and a war against Al-Qa'ida), a peacekeeping operation (to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war) and a nation-building project. Along all those lines of operation the United States has succeeded. The United States has achieved its fundamental objectives, with the help of our British, Iraqi, and other allies: stability has been brought to much of Iraq, a democratic Iraqi government is firmly in place, the Sunni and Shia insurgencies have been effectively neutralized, and al-Qa'ida in Iraq has been decisively beaten.

Iconic 18th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz posited that war is the continuation of politics by other means—that is to say all wars are waged for political objectives. Although Clausewitz wrote during a time when most wars were fought by organized armies on the battlefield, his historical observations hold true in modern insurgencies. Insurgencies are messy conflicts, they almost never end with a public surrender of the insurgents or a dramatic battlefield victory that is easily recognizable. The war in Iraq was especially messy as the United States faced not just a Sunni insurgency, but also al-Qa'ida and a Shia insurgency as well. Thus to gauge success in we must apply Clausewitz's maxim. And, in Iraq, the United States has achieved the political objectives that it sought to accomplish through military force. Therefore, declaring success for the United States in the Iraq war is not a political matter, it is an objective historical observation. In the spring of 2006, the United States had clearly not achieved its objectives. But now, in November 2008, it has. Additionally, firsthand reports from US soldiers on the ground and exceptional war correspondents such as Michael Yon confirm these achievements.

Let there be no mistake, victory in Iraq has come at a considerable cost in blood and treasure. More than 4,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent on military operations in Iraq as well as to develop the indigenous Iraqi security forces. But, despite the breathless claims by opponents of the war, liberal pundits, and mainstream media reporters, Iraq was not and is not Vietnam. Casualties among US military personnel were but a fraction of those suffered by US forces in Vietnam. Over the course of ten years of war in Vietnam, the US military lost more than 58,000 troops, or 5800 per year. The 4,200 deaths in Iraq over five and a half years average out to 763 deaths per year—a fraction of the casualty rate in Vietnam. For another point of comparison, in the Battle of Tarawa, which lasted four days in November 1943, the US Marines and Navy lost 1,687 personnel killed. This grim arithmetic is not to trivialize the sacrifice of our brave servicemen and women, but just serves to illustrate that the human cost of the Iraq War has been much lower than other extended wars that the United States has waged in the last century.

Moreover, despite the insistence of the mainstream media on reporting mainly on US casualties as opposed to other developments in the Iraq War, taking casualties is not a good metric of winning or losing a war. The story that the media tells is essentially that the US is losing the war in Iraq because it is taking casualties. That is an absurd metric. First, no wars are casualty free, so in that optic all wars would be losses. But, more importantly, casualty figures in and of themselves are poor metrics for measuring counterinsurgency war. The true metric in an counterinsurgency war is control of the population. And in Iraq, the Sunni and Shia insurgent forces are no longer in control of much of the population, the Iraqi government—with the assistance of US forces—is in control of most of the population, directly or indirectly. So it is fair—although irrelevant at this point—for people to argue as to whether we should have gone to war in 2003 or if the costs of the war are worth it, but it cannot be argued that the war has not been a success.


Stability has been brought to much of Iraq

Much of Iraq has now been pacified. Violence in Iraq has plummeted to all time lows. Al-Anbar province—the former stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al-Qa'ida—was once the most violent province in Iraq, but now it is quiet. Local Sunnis now can walk the streets and go to the markets. Commerce has resumed. US commanders have walked through Fallujah without combat armor, unthinkable a few years ago. Baghdad, once the seen of scores of vicious daily attacks by Sunni and Shia insurgents and al-Qa'ida terrorists against US troops and fellow Iraqis, was the most violent place in Iraq in 2006, but is now quiet. Businesses are booming. Confidence in the security situation has even led the government to begin planning for a multi-billion dollar underground subway construction project. Southern areas once under the sway of Sadr's militia are now under the control of the national government.



As another metric demonstrating that stability has been brought to most of Iraq, US casualties are at the lowest level since the March 2003. In October 2006, 100 soldiers in Iraq. Last month, only thirteen soldiers died in Iraq, including just seven as a result of combat.  Visit GlobalSecurity.org to check out the casualty figures yourself.

Iraq teetered on the verge of civil war in the spring of 2006. But now, the tide of sectarian violence has receded, Sectarian attacks are now isolated incidents in most areas of Iraq, where they were once daily occurrences. The days of finding mass graves of Sunni or Shia civilians executed by sectarian death squads are now in the past, and hopefully will remain as such in the future.

Iraq has a democratic government for the first time in history

The Iraq War has achieved the fundamental US goal of establishing a democratic government in Iraq, the first of its kind in the Arab world (sorry, Egypt). While the government of Iraq is far from perfect and, like most Arab countries, suffers from endemic corruption. To be sure corruption will pose a serious challenge for Iraq's democracy down the line, but that is not a problem that can be solved by the United States—it is now up to the Iraqis to get their own house in order. The established of democratic government in Iraq has brought about a monumental change in the Iraqi polity. Rival political and sectarian parties are now increasingly settling scores in the Parliament and using civil protests to assert their agenda, rather than through violence on the streets. This is a major breakthrough. Moreover, the participation of parties from all ethnic and sectarian groups—including the once reticent Sunnis—in the Parliament and in elections shows that the society is coming to accept participation in the political system—which many still view as flawed—as the way forward. Five and a half years after the fall of Saddam, Iraqis are poised to hold their second set of free elections for Parliament. After decades of being ruled by authoritarians, Iraqis now have the ability to elect their own representatives.

Certainly, there are many issues that the Shia-led Iraqi government needs to address to more firmly seal the tenuous multi-ethnic and sectarian political concord holding the political system together. A fair petroleum bill that establishes a satisfactory compromise on the distribution of Iraq's oil wealth among Sunnis (who have few oil resources in their areas), Shia, and Kurds is essential for long-term tranquility. Also, the parties must also agree on the allocation of parliamentary representation among the various ethnic and sectarian groups. Yet, again, sensitive issues such as these—as vital as they are to Iraq's long-term political future—are for the Iraqis to work out for themselves. The goal of the United States was to assist the Iraqis in establishing a sufficient level of stability so that a democratic Iraqi government can function and be free to make its own choices, and we've accomplished precisely that. The Iraqi government may end up making choices that we don't agree with, but that is what a truly independent country does.

Additionally, Iraq's security forces have made great strides. While they are far from a professional force comparable to western militaries—which is an unfair expectation only five years removed from Saddam's rule—they have made great strides. Iraqi forces have taken the lead in several provinces, including Al Anbar and now Diyala. Many Iraqi units are planning and executing their own operations, with US air and logistical support, which is a major step forward. There is still a long way to go, but with continued training and support from US forces, it is clear that, as US commanders have said, the Iraqi military is on track to take over security responsibilities in the next few years. To prevent backsliding on this progress, it is essential that even after the majority of combat troops are withdrawn under the new status of forces agreement (which will hopefully be passed by the Iraqi Parliament next week) that the United States keeps a sizeable force in Iraq to continue to train and assist the Iraqi security forces. 

The Sunni and Shia insurgencies have been effectively neutralized

The Sunni insurgency, to begin with, is something of a misnomer. There was not one primary insurgent. Rather, the Sunni insurgency was comprised of an amalgam of isurgent groups with widely differing agendas and ideologies. Many of these groups spent as much time fighting each other as they did the United States. There were nationalist groups, such as the 1920s Revolution Brigades. Islamic insurgent groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq. There were former regime elements, including the Ba'th Party. And there were notionally "insurgent" groups consisting of criminal gangs out for self aggrandizement. Over the past two years, the Sunni insurgency has been largely neutralized. The US military changed tactics beginning in the middle of 2006, under General Patraeus, shfting from period sweeps through Iraqi cities and then leaving, to clearing Iraqi cities of insurgent and terrorist cells an then remaining there to build up local security. Instead of remaining in large bases, US troops deployed forward among the populace in smaller forward bases to enhance local security efforts. At the same time, US forces co-opted local tribes and insurgent groups (many of which were based around the tribes) to get them to assist in providing local security—this started initially in Al Anbar province and became known as the Anbar Awakening—now the local Sunni allies are known as the Sons of Iraq. This model was first applied in Al Anbar but was soon emulated in Baghdad and elsewhere with great effect. The surge of 15,000 US troops to Iraq in 2007 provided US commanders the forces necessary for applying the strategy across Iraq. The US strategy was facilitated by the fact that most Sunnis by late 2006 and early 2007 had become alienated by the tactics of al-Qa'ida and its other terrorist allies, who were murdering local Sunnis with alarming frequency in assassinations and bombings of local police stations and market places. Insurgents from the 1920's Brigades and the Islamic Army (which essentially splintered) largely joined forces with the US military to fight al-Qa'ida, deciding that al-Qa'ida's desire to spark a civil war would be a calamity for Iraqi Sunnis. The realization that the United States offered the Sunni community the best means of protection against Shia depredations also drove insurgents to the American side.

The combination of the change in strategy by US forces and the turning of the Sunni populace and many insurgents against al-Qa'ida brought about the effective neutralization of the Sunni insurgency. The most powerful Sunni insurgent groups have either been co-opted, splintered or decimated by the US military and its local allies. There are still some insurgent and criminal groups that continue to fight on, launching sporadic attacks against US forces, but these groups are largely incoherent and ineffective, and most importantly they have little support among the Sunni populace. As Michael Yon writes, "Barring the unforeseen, the darkest days are behind, though we are still losing soldiers to low-level fighting with enemies that are true “dead-enders.”

In 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr spearheaded a Shia insurgency with a militia (the Jaysh al-Mahdi) that numbered in the tens of thousands across southern Iraq and in the Baghdad slum of Sadr City. The JAM was behind some of the most atrocious sectarian violence, murdering dozens of Sunnis in Baghdad and surrounding areas on a daily basis. The mullahs in Iran used the shadowy Iranian Revolutionary Guards force to supply Sadr with weapons and training, seeking to bog down US forces in Iraq. But, combined offensives by US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and southern Iraq over the last two years, following the "clear and hold" strategy shattered the JAM. While some hard-core Shia guerrillas continue to attack, the JAM's stranglehold over many Shia areas, including in Baghdad has been broken. Sadr was forced last year to accept a cease-fire, and despite threats to break it, has continued to abide by it. Sadr himself has been rumored to have left Iraq for Iran

Al-Qa'ida in Iraq has been defeated

The war against al-Qa'ida in Iraq was a war that America had to win. And win it did. Whether or not Iraq was the central front in the War on Terrorism in March 2003 is irrelevant.  Al-Qa'ida, our central nemesis in the larger war, committed itself to Iraq as the central front in the jihad against America. It set up a massive foreign fighter infiltration network to send thousands of jihadist from around the Muslim world (and even Europe) through neighboring countries, especially Syria, into Iraq to kill Americans and their apostate Iraqi allies. But even more telling are words from al-Qa'ida's leaders themselves on the importance of Iraq. In 2004, Usama bin Laden stated:

"I now address my speech to the whole of the Islamic nation: Listen and understand. The issue is big and the misfortune is momentous. The most important and serious issue today for the whole world is this Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation. It is raging in the land of the two rivers. The world's millstone and pillar is in Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate.

The whole world is watching this war and the two adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation. The nation today has a very rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it."

In 2005, al-Qa'ida's #2, Ayman al-Zawahiri to Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's (AQI) terrorist-in-chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi:

"I want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting battle in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam's history, and what is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era."

So even if Iraq was a strategic backwater to al-Qa'ida before we invaded Iraq in March 2003, it had become unquestionably the central front in the War on Terror by 2004. It was clear by that time that al-Qa'ida sought to establish a base in the Sunni areas of western Iraq from which to wage a campaign of terror to bring down the Iraqi government and from which to launch attacks throughout the Middle East and against America itself. The battle in Fallujah was not so much a battle between US Marines and Iraqi Sunni insurgents as it was a battle between the US Marines against al-Qa'ida's network in Iraq. There were more foreign jihadists in Fallujah in November 2004 than there were Iraqi insurgents. While hard numbers are unavailable, it is most likely that there were substantially more al-Qa'ida fighters in Iraq than Afghanistan in 2004. Although the majority of al-Qa'ida in Iraq was believed to have been composed of Iraqis, its leadership—including Zarqawi itself—and some 90 percent of its suicide bombers were foreigners. Even after being routed from Fallujah in November 2004, AQI continued to try to expand its reach in Iraq, forming an umbrella group with other affiliated jihad groups called the Mujahidin Shura Council and then the Islamic State of Iraq. As part of its sinister plan, AQI became focused on provoking an all-out civil war between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq. In early 2006, AQI terrorists blew up the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shia shrines, prompting a wave of sectarian violence.

However, shortly after AQI had reached the heights of power, by the middle of 2006, AQI's fortunes began to shift dramatically. In June Zarqawi found himself on the receiving end of two satellite guided JDAM bombs dropped on an AQI safehouse in Diyala province by a US F-16 fighter jet. Without Zarqawi, AQI's leadership appeared to be in disarray. By the fall of 2006 and early 2007, AQI began suffering a backlash from local Sunnis who had grown tired of AQI's tactics of attacking ordinary Sunnis who wanted to just go to the market in Ramadi, vote in elections, or join the local police force to put an end to local banditry. Instead of being defenders of the Sunnis, AQI was now perceived by most Sunnis as a foreign entity that cared little about their needs. Several prominent Sunni tribes in Al Anbar, who themselves had been victims of AQI assassinations for not toeing the AQI line, decided they had had enough of AQI's murderous antics and joined forces with the US military to hunt down AQI. Aided by the unparalleled luxury of local intelligence, the US military and their new Sunni allies—many of whom were former insurgents themselves—rapdily routed out AQI's network of jihadist cells from Al Anbar and then Baghdad. By the end of 2007, Al Anbar had become one of the safest places in Iraq. Ramadi, the provincial capital, which had once been a no-go location for US forces, who only ventured into town in large, heavily armed patrols with armored vehicles now patroled the streets in squad patroled the streets on foot, side-by-side with local Sunni "Awakening" fighters. The scene was repeated in Sunni areas in Baghdad and later in areas of Diyala province throughout 2007 and 2008, killing or driving out AQI cells in those areas.

Zarqawi's demise in June 2006, the beginning of the
end for AQI

Now, AQI's once broad network throughout northern and western Iraq had been reduced  to scattered and uncoordinated remnants who have no public support. AQI has lost hundreds of key operatives and local leaders. No longer can they conduct large-scale terrorist attacks at will. The foreign fighter streams have been reduced to a trickle, according to General Patraeus. And, most importantly, al-Qa'ida leaders themselves have stated that things have not gone well in Iraq and have shifted their focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. This is a remarkable change in strategy, especially when one considers that al-Qa'ida's plan for a global caliphate has Baghdad as its capital. While al-Qa'ida's leaders will try to paint any withdrawal of US troops from Iraq as a victory for them, the truth is that their organization as a whole has been defeated in Iraq. While there will continue to be scattered cells there for the foreseeable future that will conduct violent, and occasionally spectacular attacks, al-Qa'ida will not be able to resurrect its network there or regain influence over significant portions of the Sunni populace so long as the United States continues to support the Iraqi government in keeping Iraq to be hostile working environment for bin Laden's minions.

Assigning credit for the victory

So who deserves credit for this success? I think it's fair to assign credit for victory in Iraq to the following:

US Military: The success of the US campaign in Iraq demonstrates yet again the indomitable spirit of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. It is due to their courage and sacrifice—sacrifice in not only blood, but in years away from family in austere conditions—that the counterinsurgency efforts succeeded, because of the unrivaled combat effectiveness of our troops against wily and determined adversaries, but also because of the amazing compassion of our soldiers, who engaged with ordinary Iraqis on a personal level, winning the admiration, or at least respect, of those whom they sought to protect. Some people may laugh at the pictures of US soldiers passing out candy or kicking soccer balls with Iraqi children. But those actions are just as important in a counterinsurgency war as raiding a guerrilla safehouse. The professionalism of soldiers to continue on in a war they realize is unpopular at home and in the media is inspiring. Many soldiers re-enlisted specifically to go back to Iraq and finish the job.

 


General David Patraeus: General Patraeus was the architect of the change in US strategy on the ground in Iraq from the sweep tactics used until 2006 to the clear and hold strategy that allowed US forces to consolidate security gains made by clearing insurgents from an area and give the Iraqi security forces there time to develop, and eventually assume responsibility. It was a classic counterinsurgency approach. He was the impetus behind the surge, requesting the additional troops needed to execute this new strategy on a nationwide level, despite the hostility he knew that he would encounter in the American media and among Capitol Hill Democrats. And, he quickly embraced the Awakening movements in Al Anbar that were effective in rooting out AQI and then applied that model in Baghdad and beyond. He is definitely one of the brightest American military minds in the last 50 years. His accomplishments—turning a counterinsurgency war that was at best a protracted stalemate into an unquestionable victory—are much more impressive that those of General Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm or General Tommy Franks in the original Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 that toppled Saddam's regime in roughly three weeks.

The Iraqi people: Let's face it, without the support of the Iraqi people, none of these accomplishments would have been possible. Although they were at first hesitant to accept the US occupation and then were subject to mass intimidation by thugs of both Sunni and Shia varieties, they eventually got sick of the militants on both sides and what they saw to be an interminable conflict. Once the Sunni people in the west turned against AQI, bin Laden's minions were doomed. There was no one to shelter them anymore from the lethal power of the US military. And then many Shia grew tired of Sadr's thugs, which facilitated efforts by the US and Iraqi militaries to smack down the JAM, forcing Sadr's crew to accept a cease-fire.

George W. Bush: Certainly, the Bush administration does deserve blame for mistakes made early in the counterinsurgency war (i.e. not committing enough troops to provide local security, the mass de-Baathification in 2003 that alienated many Sunnis). But mistakes and flawed strategies happen in all wars that the United States has ever fought. That is to be expected. Success in wars requires recognizing the mistakes you make and overcoming them. And President Bush did just that. In 2006, he appointed General Patraeus to command US forces in Iraq based on his belief that Patraeus had a plan that would win the war. And it did. Most importantly, President Bush demonstrated amazing integrity and leadership in proceeding with the surge of troops to Iraq in early 2007 in the face of overwhelming criticism in the media, from a Democratic Congress, and even leaders within his own party. President-elect Barack Obama opposed it and still opposed it on the campaign trail, for the record. But Bush truly believed that the United States could not accept defeat in Iraq—doing so would have have been a regional calamity and given al-Qa'ida a safehaven to replace the one they lost Afghanistan—and that if there was a strategy that had a chance to prevail in Iraq it must be given a chance. That, my friends, is real leadership and speaks to the character of this president. I consider it to be probably the defining moment of his presidency. Instead of being the president who led the United States to defeat against the forces of Islamic extremism in Iraq, he will be the president who ousted a brutal regime and brought about the first real democracy in the Arab world.

President Bush meets a shaykh involved in the Awakening

One thing that is important is that no one should allow the next presidential administration to steal credit for the victory in Iraq. The war was over before Barack Obama came to office.

Now that we've won the war, we can't afford to lose the peace

Even though the war is over, the United States can still lose the peace if it acts irresponsibly. There is still fighting to be done against AQI remnants and hardcore Sunni insurgent holdouts.  A precipitous withdrawal that is not based on conditions on the ground in Iraq is one of those ways. Therefore, it is important for President-elect Obama to heed the advice of our military commanders and not the liberal partisans on Capitol Hill when considering when to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Also, the Iraqi government and its military are improving, but they still need our support—a lot of it—if they are to take the lead in quelling the remaining Sunni and Shia militant elements and root out dangerous international terrorists. We must not pull the financial or military rug out from under them. A stable Iraq is in America's long-term interest in the Middle East—it can be both a strong ally and a shining example of the promise of democracy to other Arab peoples. It is important that the next administration not squander this interest in a bid to appease left-wing partisans who only want to settle domestic political scores.

So, to conclude my unintentionally long commentary, thank our troops for their sacrifices. And be proud of what they have accomplished.